This paper compares two policies: trade cost reduction and …rm relocation cost reduction using a three-country version of a heterogeneous-…rms economic geography model, where the three countries have di¤erent market (population) size. We show how the e¤ects of the two 
Introduction
World-wide economic integration, often called globalisation, makes it easier to trade goods and, in many cases, makes it easier to set up plants and establishments in foreign countries. Models of economic geography and trade have focused on the e¤ects of lower trade costs. They show how industries agglomerate to large core countries as trade costs are reduced (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) for a survey). The analysis is generally performed in a two-country setting, but similar conclusions apply in a multi-country setting. 1 This reseach is partly …nanced by Grant-in-Aid for Scienti…c Research (JSPS).
y Stockholm University and CEPR; email: rf@ne.su.se.
z Kobe University; email:okubo@rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp. 1 For a multiregion analysis, see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003, ch. 14) , Forslid (2010) , Krugman and Livas (1996) and Puga and Venables (1996) . An important example of far reaching economic integration is the European Union. The focus here has been as much on lower barriers to the free mobility of production factors, such as labour and capital, as on lower trade costs for goods. 2 The economic integration in Europe has in ‡uenced the geographical patterns of industries, but unlike what models of trade and economic geography tells us, there is no strong empirical evidence of an emerging core-periphery pattern in Europe, as shown by Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) and Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) . The location pattern in Europe is therefore better described by a multi-country than a two country framework, and by an framework where the reduction of relocation costs of factors of production are analysed together with reduction of trade costs. 3 The current research on …rm location patterns focuses not only on geographical concentration, as mentioned above, but also on …rm heterogeneity in productivity. The emergence of this literature is closely related to micro-econometric results based on …rm level data sets.
More precisely, the current theoretical advancement concerns how spatial location patterns are related to …rm heterogeneity in labour productivity, and how …rms are selected or sorted to markets of di¤erent size according their productivity. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show how the most productive …rms have the strongest incentives to move to the larger countries leading to spatial sorting, with the less productive …rms left in the periphery when there is a fall in trade costs. On the empirical side Combes et. al. (2009) show how …rm heterogeneity in ‡uences the productivity of French cities. 4 To analyse these issues, the present paper studies the e¤ects of lower relocation costs of …rms (capital) as well as lower trade costs and presents a three-country economic geography model with heterogeneous …rms. Relocation costs in our model are any costs associated with the geographical movement of a production facility, such as e.g. regulatory barriers. 5 Our analysis shows how the collapse of all industry to the core may be speci…c to two-country models analysing economic integration in the form of lower trade costs only. Here, we use a model with large, intermediate and small countries. In addition to lower trade costs, we analyse economic integration in the form of lower relocation costs. We show that, contrary to trade liberalisation, lower relocation costs can lead to …rm relocation into both the large and the intermediate country.
The framework we use is a multi-country version of the heterogeneous …rms trade and location model by Baldwin and Okubo (2006) . We …nd several new results. Lower trade costs 2 The …rst 'pillar'of the Maastricht Treaty includes the the Internal Market with its four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, workers and capital, as well as the Single Market Programme including harmonisation of standards. 3 Okubo and Rebeyrol (2005) analyse a fall in relocation costs but use a two country framework. . 4 There is also a body of literature showing that workers and …rms on average are more productive in larger markets (Head and Mayer, 2004; Redding and Venables, 2004; Syverson, 2004 Syverson, , 2006 and Amiti and Cameron, 2007) . 5 Relocations costs could also encompass such phenomena as a malfunctioning housing market that makes it di¢ cult to establish a factory in a new location.
tend to produce the usual concentration of economic activity to the core (large) country in our model. That is, industry from all countries moves towards the core. Despite this, welfare increases for all countries as a result of trade liberalisation. 6 Lower relocation costs also lead to an increased concentration to the core but, unless the intermediate country is very small, it is only …rms from the smallest country that move there. The intermediate country actually gains industry as a consequence of lower relocation costs. Welfare increases for the large and intermediate countries, whereas the small country that loses industry experiences declining welfare in this case.
A policy implication of our analysis is that European countries of intermediate size, in particular, may bene…t from free mobility of production factors within EU. Turning to development strategies of poor countries, our analysis indicates that intermediate size developing countries may be better served by focusing on FDI than on trade. Lower barriers to FDI would lead to an in ‡ow of industry, whereas lower trade costs could lead to the opposite. Our model could also be applied to a regional context within a country, where trade costs are interpreted as transportation costs only. An interpretation of our results, from a regional perspective, is that the long-run prospects of regional centers outside the largest core regions could be upgraded as a result of lower relocation costs.
The Model
We use a multi-country version of the Baldwin and Okubo (2006) 
Basics
There are n countries with an asymmetric population (market size). Countries are ordered so that Country 1 is the largest and Country n the smallest. There are two types of factors of production, capital and labour. Capital, which is sector speci…c, can move between countries but capital owners do not. Workers can move freely between sectors but are immobile between countries. A homogeneous good is produced with a constant-returns technology only using labour. Di¤erentiated manufactures are produced with increasing-returns technologies using both capital and labour. The mass of di¤erentiated …rms is normalised to one, N 1:
All individuals have the utility function
(1) 6 Our results on trade liberalisation are related to those of Gopinath and Saito (2011) where 2 (0; 1); > 1 are constants and is the set of consumed variety. C M is a consumption index of manufacturing goods and C A is consumption of the homogenous good. c l is the amount consumed of variety l: Country subscripts are suppressed when possible for ease of notation.
Each consumer spends a share of his income on manufactures. Total demand for a domestically produced variety i is
where p l is the price of variety l and Y income in the country.
Ownership of capital is assumed to be fully internationally diversi…ed; that is, if one country owns X-percent of the world capital stock, it will own X-percent of the capital in each country.
The income of each country is therefore constant and independent of the location of capital.
World expenditure equals world factor income E W = wL W + E W = : Without loss of generality,
we choose units so that L W 1; which gives E W = 1 1 = : Income of country j is equal to its share of world expenditures given by
Y j is thus constant irrespective of the location of capital; i.e. also out of long-run equilibrium.
Turning to the supply side, the homogeneous good sector is a constant returns and perfect competition sector. The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labour.
The good is freely traded and since it is also chosen as the numeraire, we have
w being the wage of workers in all countries.
In the production of di¤erentiated goods, …rms have a …rm speci…c unit labour input coe¢ -cient (a) and uses one unit of capital, as in the standard footloose capital model. Fixed amount of capital endowments in the world leads to no entry and exit of …rms, whilst international capital mobility allows …rms to move between countries. Total costs for …rm i are speci…ed as
where the …xed cost consists of capital, whereas the variable cost consists of labour. Importantly …rms are heterogeneous and their …rm-speci…c marginal production costs a i are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (a).
Geographical distance is represented by trading costs. Shipping the manufactured good involves a frictional trade cost of the "iceberg" form: for one unit of good from country j to arrive in country k, jk > 1 units must be shipped. Trade costs are symmetric between all countries jk = 8 j; k:
Pro…t maximisation by manufacturing …rms leads to a constant mark-up over marginal cost 
Short-run equilibrium
In the short run equilibrium, the allocation of capital in each country is taken to be …xed.
Capital owners hold capital in their country of origin. s j denotes the share of capital and the number (mass) of …rms in Country j since one unit of capital corresponds to one …rm, and
Firm heterogeneity in labour requirements, a i ; is probabalistically allocated among …rms. In order to analytically solve the model, we follow Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and assume a Pareto cumulative density function of a:
where > 1 is a shape parameter and a 0 a is a scaling factor. We assume the distribution to be truncated at 0 < a < a 0 so that the productivity of …rms is bounded, and we normalise so that a 0 = 1: Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of …rms in the three economies before capital can move.
The return to capital of a …rm in a country j is the …rm's operating pro…t,
where the right-hand side follows from the demand functions in (2) and
The object jk 1 jk , ranging between 0 and 1, stands for "free-ness" of trade between countries j and k (0 is autarky and 1 is zero trade costs). It is assumed that the labour stock is su¢ ciently large so that the agricultural sector, which pins down the wage, is active in all countries.
Consider now what would happen if …rms were allowed to move between countries. From (8) the …rms' return to capital is convex and falling in a i . Firms with the highest labour productivity (the lowest a i ) have the largest pro…ts and will be the most sensitive to market size and thus have the strongest incentives to move to the large market. Under reasonable assumptions of moving costs, this would lead to sorting with the most productive …rms in the larger market, as shown by Baldwin and Okubo (2006) .
More formally, a …rm will move from k to j when
where is a per-unit of capital …xed relocation cost. 7 In the following we proceed with a three-country analysis, which is the simplest structure that enables us to focus on countries of intermediate size. 
Relocation tendencies
Before moving to the full long-run solution of the model, we consider the relocation incentives faced by …rms starting out from the initial equilibrium. Figure 2 shows j (a i ) k (a i ) for all country pairs.
Note that we rule out that …rms have in…nite productivity by assuming a to be bounded from below at a: 8 The incentive to relocate increases in …rm size as well as in the market size di¤erence between two countries. Higher productivity …rms are more sensitive to market size di¤erence and have stronger incentives to move to large markets. The largest size di¤erence Figure 2 : Pro…t di¤erentials between countries corresponding to the highest curve in Figure 2 is always between the largest and the smallest country. Then, the curves will be ordered depending on the relative size of countries.
The e¤ects of relocation costs can be seen from Figure 2 . For a high moving cost, as illustrated by line 0 in the …gure, only the most productive …rms from the smallest country will migrate to Country 1. As relocation costs are reduced, relocation will take place between more countries. The extent of relocation between di¤erent countries will depend on their relative size.
When turning to the long run equilibrium, …rms start to move and we need to explicitly model the dynamics. With many countries, there will in general be a simultaneous relocation between several country pairs.
Long-run equilibrium
In the long run equilibrium, capital is fully mobile between countries and responsive to the incentives provided by the relative returns that can be obtained in the two countries. 9 Thus, …rms are mobile internationally. However, note that capital owners are bound to their country of origin, and capital rewards are therefore repatriated to the country of origin. The value of relocation to a larger market is highest for the most productive …rms since they have higher sales and are better equipped to cope with the higher competition in the large market. Relocation therefore starts from the high end of the productivity distribution. Generally, the value of migrating for a …rm depends on its own marginal cost and the mass of …rms that have already migrated, a R : The value of migrating from smaller market (Country k) to the larger market (Country j) at a point in time is therefore
where
and where B is a measure of the average per-…rm market size that is independent of the …rm's productivity, a i . The long-run equilibrium is determined by solving v jk (a R ) = 0 for a R :
The relative size of countries will be of key importance in any multiple country setting. As mentioned above, we assume that s 1 > s 2 > s 3 , which implies that relocation will start from Country 3 to Country 1. The long-run implications for the intermediate country, Country 2, will depend on its relative size. To highlight market size di¤erences, we assume that is the same between all country pairs.
The e¤ect of reduced trade costs
Trade liberalisation (an increase in ) a¤ects the value of relocation. A di¢ culty, when analysing trade liberalisation with many countries, is that it may be that …rms from one country move to two other countries simultaneously or that …rms from two countries simultaneously move to a third country. When …rms are heterogeneous, it becomes di¢ cult to keep track of the sorting of …rms when this happens. To simplify the analysis, we assume in this section that, instead of a …xed relocation cost, there is a …rm relocation cost à la Baldwin and Okubo (2006) that is related to the migration pressure. The relocation cost is high when many …rms move out of a country at the same time, or when many …rms move in to a country at the same time, but gradually declines as the migration pressure falls when we approach equilibrium. This assumption implies that the most productive …rm is the …rst to relocate and that it moves to the location with the highest return. It will likewise be the …rms with the highest gains that are the …rst to move into a country. This implies that as long as the gains from moving between country pairs are di¤erent, out-migration of …rms from a country will go to one destination country at a time, while …rms migrating into a country will come from one source country at a time.
The equilibrium path
Using the above logic, starting from autarchy the productive …rms in the smallest country move to the other countries. Section 6.1 in the Appendix shows that 
where This relocation pattern is illustrated in the left-hand part of Figure 3 . However, successive trade liberalisations reduce the pro…t gap between Country 1 and 3 more than between Country 2 and 3:
< 0 as shown in section 6.1 in the Appendix. When we reach
, and here relocation also starts from Country 3 to Country 2. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by the hump-shape for Country 2.
Further liberalisation a¤ects the pro…t di¤erentials according to: 
Welfare e¤ects of reduced trade costs
In the case of homogenous …rms, the small and intermediate countries will always gain from trade liberalisation despite losing their entire manufacturing industry. 12 Here, we consider heterogeneous …rms and the welfare consequences are therefore potentially di¤erent because of the sorting of the least productive …rms to the periphery.
The welfare of country j could be measured by real income,
. The trade cost reduction has two e¤ects on welfare. It reduces the price of imports, which is always positive for welfare, but it also leads to an out ‡ow of …rms for the smaller countries, which is negative for welfare since these varieties must now be imported.
Since w = p A = 1 and capital is fully internationally diversi…ed, it su¢ ces to study the price index, P j = We next turn to the e¤ects of reduced relocation costs. As will be seen, these e¤ects can be very di¤erent than for reduced trade costs. 1 2 See e.g. Forslid (2010).
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Here, we discus the general e¤ects of reduced relocation costs keeping trade costs …xed. In the following subsections, we derive the critical levels of relocation costs where relocation changes nature (the sustain and bifurcation points).
The equilibrium path
Starting from a hypothetical situation with a given and with high relocation costs ; where the line does not intersect with any of the pro…t di¤erential curves in Figure 2 , there will be no relocation. Gradually reducing we reach a point where the line reaches the …rst pro…t-di¤erential curve and relocation starts. The …rst …rms to move are the most productive …rms in the smallest country, which move to the largest country; thus, from Country 3 to Country 1.
Further reductions in imply that successively less productive …rms move. The relocation of …rms into Country 1 reduces B 1 and thereby the incentives to move to Country 1. Despite this, …rms from Country 3 will never prefer to move to Country 2 instead of Country 1, as shown in section 6.3 in the Appendix.
The marginal …rm at equilibrium, a R ; is de…ned by the condition that
The relocation of …rms from Country 3 to Country 1, as relocation costs are reduced, will reduce B 1 as competition increases in Country 1 and for the same reasons, it will increase B 3 :
However, B 2 and the pro…t of …rms in Country 2 remain constant since the price index is una¤ected when no …rms relocate to or from Country 2 and when trade costs are unchanged.
That is, prices of import goods in Country 2 are unchanged, even if …rms relocate from Country 3 to Country 1, since the cost of import, determined by ; is the same from both countries. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , where the B 1 line falls and B 3 rises as successively as less productive …rms relocate.
In the case illustrated in Figure 4 , B 1 converges to B 2 while B 3 < B 1 = B 2 . A su¢ cient condition for this to happen is that s 1 s 2 < s 2 s 3 as shown in section 6.3 in the Appendix.
At the point where B 1 = B 2 , we have that
since
Countries 1 and 2 are then equally attractive for a potential relocater from Country 3; and relocation from Country 3 therefore goes to both Country 1 and Country 2 from this point on.
Successively lower relocation costs will lead to a gradual relocation from Country 3 until no Figure 5 , where decreases along the x-axis. 13 The e¤ects of lower relocation costs are thus very di¤erent from the e¤ects of reduced trade Our interest lies in the case where s 1 s 2 < s 2 s 3 , as illustrated in Figure 5 . There are two 1 3 When the intermediate country is smaller so that s1 s2 > s2 s3; it will instead be the case that the system reaches a point where B3 = B2 < B1 as relocation costs are reduced. At this point, relocation starts from both Country 2 and 3 towards Country 1. Thus, this case resembles the core-periphery outcome that is the result of trade liberalisation, and this case will not be further analysed here. 
Phase 1 (relocation from Country 3 to Country 1)
We here analyse relocation under phase 1 when …rms in Country 3 only relocate to Country 1.
This phase continues until B 1 = B 2 .
As noted above, the cut-o¤, a R , is determined by the following equation:
where B 1 1 = . Superscript "1 " indicates phase 1. are given by
where 1 + 1 a 1 a ; 1 + and 1 a . Note that …rm relocation never a¤ects 2 and B 2 in phase 1. Using these de…nitions, we get
As a result of total di¤erentiation, we get
a decline in relocation costs promotes relocation, which decreases B 1 but increases B 3 . This relocation phase …nishes when B 1 = B 2 . The cut-o¤ at the bifurcation point is
and the level of relocation costs is
Phase 2 (Relocation from Country 3 to Country 1 and Country 2)
When relocation costs are lower than B , B 1 = B 2 and relocation from Country 3 goes to both The cut-o¤, a R ; is determined by the condition that . Superscript "2" indicates phase 2 . 
Note that B 2 1 = B 2 2 . Using these expressions, we get
As a result of total di¤erentiation, we can derive
The relocation cost at the sustain point when all …rms have left Country 3 is given by
All …rms are concentrated in Country 1 and Country 2 when relocation costs are lower than S . Importantly, when = S ; the relocation process …nishes. Even if relocation costs are reduced from S , no …rms relocate from Country 2 to Country 1 since the B 0 s are not directly a¤ected by . From the sustain point and onwards, we have B S 1 = B S 2 , where
where superscript "S" indicates the sustain point. This di¤ers starkly from the usual coreperiphery outcome. Full agglomeration never occurs as a result of reduced relocation costs in our model. Both Country 1 and Country 2 experience an in ‡ow of industry.
Welfare e¤ects of reduced relocation costs
Once more, the price index, P j = 
Concluding Discussion
This paper analyses a three-country trade and location model with heterogenous …rms, where the e¤ects of trade liberalisation and a reduction of …rm relocation costs are compared. Trade liberalisation eventually leads to the usual core periphery outcome with all …rms in the core, also in our case of multiple (three) countries and heterogeneous …rms. However, this is no longer the case when considering the e¤ect of lower relocation costs and multiple (three) countries.
Unless the intermediate country is too small, it will grow (as will the largest country) as a result of reduced relocation costs.
The welfare implications of trade liberalisation and reduced relocation costs also di¤er. Our model may be applied in a national context, where the policy experiments are regional policies, or it may be applied in an international context where the policy experiments pertain to di¤erent aspects of globalisation. First, from a regional policy perspective, the above experiments imply that it is of great importance how the integration of di¤erent regions in a country is achieved. Regional policy may involve policies that make it easier for individuals and …rms to move between regions, such as subsidies for movers or a better functioning real estate market, as well as policies that decrease transportation costs, such as better roads and trains. The …rst of these policies corresponds to a lower relocation cost in the model and the second to lower trade costs. From the perspective of the largest core region, these policies are both attractive as they lead to an increased concentration to the core and higher welfare. However, the interests of the two smaller regions di¤er. Lower relocation costs lead to higher welfare and more industry in the intermediate region (unless it is very small), whereas it leads to a loss of industry and welfare for the smallest region. Lower transportation costs lead to a deindustrialisation of the intermediate region along with the smallest one, while both regions gain in welfare.
Second, from an international perspective, our policy experiments imply that the development strategies of countries di¤er. In particular, the strategy may be di¤erent for very small 
First, we prove that, starting from autarky, …rms in Country 3 always relocate to Country 1 rather than to Country 2:
= a Likewise
Since 1 > 2 and B 1 = B 2 , we have that
Second, we prove that …rms in Country 3 always relocate to Country 1 rather than to Country 2 for a range of trade costs:
Since 1 > 2 , we have that
< 0, and that
We here derive the relative size of the second derivatives
Furthermore, using these two derivatives, we can get
Thus, we can derive
We here derive the point of the top of the hump-shaped …rms'location in Country 2. Because of the congestion cost when entering Country 1, there is no movement from Country 2 to Country 1 as long as
Straightforward calculation shows that this condition holds for
When c a R = a R , the most productive …rms in Country 2 will start to relocate to Country 1 since
The welfare e¤ect of trade liberalisation for the small country
Here, we prove that trade liberalisation always improves the per-capita welfare of the smallest country (Country 3). Once Country 3 has been completely deindustrialised, it will obviously gain from further reductions in trade costs, since lower trade costs reduce the price index due to cheaper imports. However, we need to be shown the welfare consequences during the phase when Country 3 loses industry due to trade liberalisation.
In the long-run equilibrium, B 1 = B 3 always holds as long as there is a manufacturing industry in both countries. The following equation must therefore be satis…ed in the equilibrium: 
